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Trends in Communist Media

19 Nov 75

TCM 75-46

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**FBIS** FOREIGN BROADCAST  
INFORMATION SERVICE

# Trends in Communist Media

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19 NOVEMBER 1975  
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 46)

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## ECONOMIC SUMMIT MEETING

### MOSCOW DISPARAGES RESULTS, STRESSES DISUNITY

Following on its earlier predictions of failure for the six-nation economic summit held at the chateau de Rambouillet near Paris on 15-17 November, Moscow was quick to disparage the results of the conference.\* Treating the event as a symptom of what it has long been describing as a worsening crisis of capitalism, Moscow has predictably stressed the signs of contention among the Western nations and played down indications that some progress toward accommodation was achieved. Other communist nations have thus far paid little attention to the meeting, with China providing only one report, mainly a replay of Western comment, and Eastern Europe--with the exception of East Germany--largely ignoring the event.

**WESTERN DIFFERENCES** In comment prior to the conclusion of the summit, Moscow had observed that previous high-level attempts to solve the economic crisis had failed and that the current summit was being viewed even in the West with considerable skepticism and uncertainty. TASS correspondent G. Shishkin on the 14th charged that the participants were "clearly aware" that their efforts would be "futile" and that the real aim was merely "to refurbish the front of the capitalist system." In a similar prediction of failure, commentator Valentin Zorin, speaking on Moscow radio on the 16th, stated that the "ailment" of capitalism is "far too serious to be cured by speeches and joint communiques."

While there were some suggestions that the United States had doomed the summit to failure by its lukewarm attitude, the main thrust of Soviet comment centered on differences between the countries over monetary and trade matters, and U.S.-French disagreements in particular. IZVESTIYA on the 15th saw the squabbling over Canada's participation as being symptomatic of the "acute differences" between the countries. Conflicting U.S.-French views on regulation of currency rates were also singled out in comment, but only one post-summit comment to date--Viktor Glazunov in a Moscow radio commentary on the 18th--has mentioned the U.S.-French compromise on this issue. Glazunov called this a "kind of rapprochement" in U.S.-French viewpoints, but he questioned whether the "intention" could be translated into reality.

**DECLARATION "VAGUE"** Though Moscow has reported the summit participants' expressed readiness to develop closer cooperation and continue their "constructive dialog," comment following the conference has focused largely on the "vagueness" of

\* The participating countries were the United States, France, Great Britain, West Germany, Italy and Japan.

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the final declaration and the absence of any details and practical solutions. Zorin, in another radio commentary on the 18th, thought it significant that the summit issued a "declaration" which merely proclaimed general principles rather than an "agreement" with practical recommendations. Glazunov's commentary noted that the declaration did not have "a single word" about how the countries intended to fight unemployment, inflation, currency instability and payment deficits.

Moscow predictably approved of the summit's expressed intention to strive for better economic relations with the socialist countries, but at the same time had a word of caution for the developing countries. Moscow suggested that the Rambouillet summit had the secondary purpose of coordinating the viewpoints of the rich industrialized countries and formulating a policy for negotiations with the developing nations at the mid-December international energy conference. Glazunov warned that this "select club of the capitalist world" would try to solve its problems at the expense of the developing countries.

OTHER COMMUNIST COMMENT      Peking's sole response came in a 17 November NCNA report on the conclusion of the Paris summit, which cited comment from Western leaders and press allegedly demonstrating the failure of the meeting to suggest concrete remedies for the serious economic problems facing the West. Citing an AP dispatch, NCNA noted that the final declaration of the summit had chartered "no visible route from the depths of depression." NCNA did note the reported U.S.-French agreement on the exchange rate, describing it as a "rapprochement" between the two countries. The report portrayed the summit declaration's call for a "cooperative relationship" between the developed and developing countries as a setback for alleged U.S. efforts to organize a "common front" among industrialized states against the raw material-producing states, and a victory for French President Giscard's advocacy of more effective dialog between the two groups.

With the exception of East Germany, which largely echoed Moscow's comment, the East European countries have said very little about the summit. Hungary's sole comment to date, a Budapest radio report on the 17th, surmised that the meeting was probably not as successful as the participants claimed. A Yugoslav commentary on the 18th took a more generous view of the summit results, but recommended caution in reaching a final assessment. It said it would be necessary to wait until the international energy conference in December to evaluate the intentions of the six nations and see whether the summit represented a new kind of behavior in international economic relations.

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## SOVIET-WEST GERMAN RELATIONS

### MOSCOW WELCOMES SCHEEL, PLAYS DOWN DIFFERENCES OVER W. BERLIN

Moscow's publicity for the 10-15 November visit to the USSR by West German President Scheel and Foreign Minister Genscher conveyed mainly an impression of cordiality and mutual satisfaction. Although there were references to "unresolved differences" in some of the reportage, the main stress was on the favorable development of Soviet-West German relations. This accent on the positive is in accord with the protocolary nature of the visit and contrasted with the treatment of Chancellor Schmidt's October 1974 working visit to the USSR, which saw Brezhnev and Soviet commentators refer openly to West Berlin and other bilateral disputes.\* On this occasion Moscow refrained from directly mentioning differences over West Berlin and the stale-mated negotiations between the two countries on cultural, legal and scientific cooperation agreements.

Soviet accounts of the visit recalled Scheel's role as an architect of the 1970 Soviet-West German treaty and described him as a "friend" of the Soviet Union. The general warm tone in which the Scheel visit was depicted is at sharp variance with Soviet treatment of the mid-October visit to Moscow by France's President Giscard d'Estaing.

While a TASS account on the 11th of Brezhnev's meeting with Scheel provided little information on what was discussed, it did note that questions pertaining to the "state of bilateral relations" and "prospects for their further development" were "touched upon." TASS also stated that "satisfaction was expressed" with "past work" aimed at consolidating the positive changes in relations between the two countries. According to TASS, the meeting took place in a "businesslike, friendly atmosphere"--a verbal formulation suggesting there was less substantive progress than during the Schmidt-Brezhnev meeting in 1974, which was described as "businesslike and constructive." The different description provided for the Scheel visit, again, may be due largely to its status as a protocol visit.

Dispatches by West German correspondents shed some light on the substance of the Brezhnev-Scheel talks. They reported that Brezhnev had made "satisfactory utterances concerning Berlin" and that he had also expressed confidence that "with patience" it would be possible to settle differences between the two countries. This emphasis on patience and the need to move ahead slowly but deliberately cropped up several

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\* See the TRENDS of 6 November 1974, page 10, for a report on Schmidt's visit to the Soviet Union.

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times in remarks by both the West German and Soviet leaders, but at no time did Brezhnev relate this directly to the Berlin question.

Despite the overall optimistic atmosphere of the visit, Moscow saw fit to censor a few of Scheel's remarks which touched on sensitive issues. In a dinner speech on the 10th Scheel expressed gratitude to the Soviet government for allowing thousands of ethnic Germans to emigrate to West Germany. According to Western press reports he also urged Moscow to continue to show humaneness by allowing other separated Germans to emigrate. PRAVDA, in its 11 November version of Scheel's speech, blurred this remark by reporting only that Scheel had voiced hope that "these questions"--meaning future emigration--will also "be resolved further." TASS and PRAVDA also failed to report Scheel's hope, expressed on Soviet television on the 12th, that the German people would "regain their historic unity in concord with their neighbors."

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## P R C - F R A N C E

## PEKING FAVORABLY PORTRAYS GISCARD POLICY TOWARD DETENTE

A recent series of NCNA reports has given unusually favorable Chinese coverage of French President Giscard d'Estaing, citing his reported resistance to Soviet positions on detente during his mid-October visit to the USSR and noting that under his leadership there has been closer French defense cooperation with NATO. The reports, consisting mainly of NCNA replays of remarks by the French President and comment in the French press, mark a departure from China's more circumspect treatment of France under former President Pompidou, during a time of close Paris-Moscow ties and French coolness toward NATO.\*

NCNA followed its usual practice in reporting Giscard's 14-18 October Moscow visit in a terse item on the 18th. An unusual 6 November NCNA report, however, belatedly recalled French press comment characterizing the visit as a clear indication of the French President's firm rebuff to Moscow's "pressure" for detente. It cited the French press judgment that Giscard had shown that he was "not ready to sacrifice his country's military independence for the sake of detente." Peking noted approvingly Giscard's determination to maintain the strategic vigilance of France and not to let anyone "dictate conditions on her in this respect."

The article also publicized reported Giscard-Brezhnev differences in interpreting European Security Conference provisions on the exchange of ideas and ideological competition. Giscard was portrayed as calling for an end to Soviet clandestine support for "certain pro-Soviet forces" in France--a euphemism used in the past by Peking to refer to Moscow-aligned communists. NCNA noted critically that Brezhnev had "flatly rejected" the French position, thereby underlining his alleged intention to disregard Helsinki conference human rights provisions and to continue Soviet "subversion in the West."

NCNA reports of 7 and 13 November favorably played up Giscard's recent public statements in support of French strategic independence, noting particularly his call for a French naval buildup in the Mediterranean and his backing of further French development of nuclear weapons. NCNA has depicted the French moves as directed chiefly against Moscow, underlining a growing trend in Chinese media to view French military might as an important component of overall Western defense arrangements against the alleged Soviet threat.

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\* Sino-French strains were evident during Pompidou's September 1973 trip to China, which is discussed in the TRENDS of 19 September 1973, page 13.

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During the past year, China has noted with approval the French President's advocacy of closer French cooperation with NATO. Last May, for instance, NCNA reported President Giscard's trip to Brussels to confer unofficially with President Ford and with other NATO leaders meeting at the NATO summit there. NCNA cited Giscard's disclosure to the press that he had told President Ford that "although France has withdrawn from the NATO military organs, it is still a member of the alliance." Since then Peking has noted with increased frequency evidence of the French administration's cooperation with NATO countries to coordinate strategy and engage in joint military exercises against the Soviet "threat."

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## PRC - BURMA

### NE WIN VISIT SIGNALS NEW WARMTH IN BILATERAL RELATIONS

Peking greeted Burmese President Ne Win with notable warmth during his 11-15 November visit to China, and in turn Burma supported Peking in expressing opposition to international "hegemony," Peking's codeword for resistance to Soviet expansion. In recent months Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand have also signed communiques endorsing Peking's anti-hegemony position. Ne Win's visit--his first official visit to Peking since 1965--was described by NCNA in somewhat warmer terms than were used for other recent noncommunist visitors. For example, Philippine President Marcos in June and Thai Prime Minister Khukrit in early July were described as having "friendly" conversations with Mao, while Ne Win was said to have had a "cordial and friendly" conversation, a description which had also been used during his 1965 visit.

Peking seemed concerned to reflect a special relationship with Burma, a country it has had diplomatic relations with since 1950. Ne Win made an "informal" visit to China in August 1971 to mark the restoration of normal relations, which had been disrupted by Sino-Burmese friction during the cultural revolution.\* No communique and little substantive comment had marked the 1971 visit, in keeping with its unofficial character, but Ne Win had seen Mao for what was described as a "friendly" visit.

Ne Win's current visit was hailed in an 11 November PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial and he was welcomed at the airport by Vice Premiers Teng Hsiao-ping, Chang Chun-chiao, and Ku Mu and Peking party chief Wu Te. Teng hosted a welcoming banquet that evening in a "warm and friendly" atmosphere. Teng held talks with Ne Win on 12-14 November, and the "cordial and friendly" conversation with Mao Tse-tung was held on the 13th. After hosting a reciprocal banquet on 14 November, Ne Win departed for home via Canton on the 15th.

The communique on the present visit, released by NCNA on the 15th, reaffirmed both sides' faith in the five principles of coexistence and renewed praise given in 1965 to the model character of the Sino-Burmese border treaty. Neither the communique nor Peking comment on this visit referred directly to the 1960 Sino-Burmese treaty of friendship and mutual nonaggression, which had been repeatedly hailed during the 1965 visit but ignored on the 1971 visit. However, the communique reaffirmed in language identical to the treaty that

\* Ne Win's August 1971 visit to Peking was discussed in the TRENDS of 18 August 1971, pages 23-25.

both sides agreed "not to carry out acts of aggression against each other and not to take part in any military alliances directed against each other." The 15 November communique, as had the 1965 communique, also expressed "satisfaction" with the "deep and steady" development of friendly relations between the two countries and with the implementation of economic and technical cooperation between them.

The current communique reaffirmed the right of the people of each country to determine their own political, economic, and social system free from outside interference. At the same time, Teng Hsiao-ping also reaffirmed Peking's support for the "just struggles of all oppressed nations and all oppressed peoples" in his 11 November banquet speech. Peking has used this formula during the visits of other noncommunist Southeast Asian leaders to affirm its dual approach to the region's states and Maoist insurgencies.\*

Teng Hsiao-ping's assessment of the situation in postwar Southeast Asia in his 11 November banquet speech was distinctly more optimistic than assessments he made in June speeches welcoming Philippine President Marcos and Thai Prime Minister Khukrit.\*\* Without naming either superpower, Teng cited "extremely gratifying" developments in the region, referring to the decline of SEATO, the "boycott by most Asian countries" of the Soviet-proposed "Asian collective security system," the increasing awareness of the "true features" of the Soviet menace, and the extensive improvement in relations between Asian countries "as big power hegemonism declines and suffers defeats." While Teng warned that the superpowers would continue to "carry out infiltration and expansion and sow discord" in the region, he added that the trend toward independence and unity in the region "will ultimately triumph."

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\* Peking's policy toward both states and leftist insurgencies in Southeast Asia, is discussed in the 22 August 1975 FBIS "Special Report," "Peking's 'Dual-Track' Policy in Southeast Asia Produces Gains."

\*\* Teng's speeches during the Marcos and Khukrit visits are discussed in the TRENDS of 11 June 1975, pages 17-18 and of 2 July 1975, pages 13-14, respectively.

## ANGOLAN INDEPENDENCE

### USSR SUPPORTS LUANDA GOVERNMENT, CONDEMNS OPPOSING GROUPS

The proclamation of Angola's independence from Portugal on 11 November prompted a predictable outpouring of Soviet media comment supporting the Luanda government formed by Agostinho Neto, leader of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). Moscow comment has shown some sensitivity toward African criticism of Soviet involvement in the Angolan civil war, but this did not deter Moscow from acknowledging its assistance to the "fighting Angolan people" in standard Soviet terms, in a message from Soviet President Podgornyy on the 11th that conferred Soviet recognition of the People's Republic of Angola (PRA) headed by Neto. Soviet media continue to condemn "splittist" activities by the other two Angolan liberation movements--the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)--and to complain about alleged foreign intervention in the conflict.

Podgornyy's 11 November message to PRA President Neto declared Moscow's readiness to exchange diplomatic missions at the ambassadorial level and affirmed that the Soviet Union, "discharging its international duty, has invariably been on the side of the fighting Angolan people and has given its patriotic forces all-round assistance and support." A similar formulation was used by Podgornyy last June in his message marking Mozambique independence day.

Several Moscow commentaries have appeared to reflect Soviet defensiveness in the face of African criticism of Moscow's backing for the MPLA. On the 11th, for example, TASS commentator Kulik condemned support to the FNLA and UNITA by "imperialists," Zaire, and South Africa, and expressed "surprise" at "voices heard from several African countries, maintaining that assistance to the MPLA is tantamount to interference in the domestic affairs of Angola." Kulik dismissed the charges by asserting that "assistance to the MPLA is assistance to independent Angola."

Ignoring the refusal by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to back any one of the contesting Angolan factions, a TASS report on the 13th cited Guinean President Sekou Toure as charging that African countries taking a divisive position on the Angolan issue were acting counter to the OAU charter. And on the 18th, a Moscow

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broadcast in French to Africa complained that "certain African leaders" were being "misled" by a "vast campaign of lies and slander" by the "imperialists" and Peking against Soviet policies toward Africa.

TASS observer Yakovlev, in an 18 November article published in PRAVDA, rejected Chinese criticism of Soviet policies in Angola contained in a 15 November PRC Foreign Ministry statement. The article denounced Peking's "bombastic propaganda campaign" and accused the Chinese of colluding with the United States on the Angolan issue "during the recent contacts in Peking." Yakovlev also condemned the Chinese for sending weapons, money, and military instructors to "splittist elements" rather than to the government "recognized by many countries of Africa, Asia, and other continents."

#### PRC FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT BLAMES MOSCOW FOR CIVIL WAR

A 15 November PRC Foreign Ministry statement hailed Angola's independence from Portugal on 11 November, authoritatively reiterating standard Peking positions on the need for peaceful reconciliation of the three rival Angolan liberation organizations and criticizing Soviet "interference" there. The PRC Foreign Ministry statement followed a 12 November PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article scoring Soviet interference in Angola and interference in OAU attempts to mediate between Angolan liberation groups, as well as a 13 November PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial hailing Angolan independence and attacking Soviet involvement. NCNA has also carried an unusually large volume of selective foreign comment on Angola.\*

Peking media have not mentioned a message from Mao Tse-tung to OAU Chairman Idi Amin, thus far monitored only from the Kampala radio. According to the radio, Mao thanked Amin for his 12 November message of appreciation for Peking's position on Angola and expressed support for the OAU stand on Angola.

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\* In the week of 10-16 November, 18 percent of all monitored Peking radio broadcasts dealt with the Angola issue. During the past year, only such major international events as the European Security Conference and the "liberation" of Cambodia and South Vietnam have received greater Peking radio coverage.

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The 15 November foreign ministry statement extended "warm congratulations" on independence from Portugal to the "Angolan people and all three Angolan liberation organizations" in the name of the "Chinese Government and people." Though criticizing in passing the rivalry of "the two superpowers" in Angola, the statement charged that Moscow's "undisguised expansion and crude interference" was principally responsible for the "unfortunate situation of division and civil war." It accused the "Soviet leadership" of exploiting "normal" differences among the Angolan liberation groups which might have been overcome through peaceful consultations without outside interference. The statement added that the Chinese Government "highly appreciated and resolutely supported" the "just stand" and "positive suggestions" of the OAU in seeking a government of national union in Angola, and stated that the Chinese Government and people "sincerely hope" that the Angolan liberation organizations can still achieve such a solution. As usual, Peking did not mention the Angolan liberation groups by name. The statement represents no change in the substance of Peking's past pronouncements on Angola, except to invoke the name of the "Chinese Government and people." Previous authoritative comment by Peking had consistently invoked only the name of the "Chinese people."\*

The 13 November PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial had routinely hailed all three Angolan groups' contributions "in jointly fighting the enemy" to win independence, labeled the Soviet Union the "arch-criminal" sabotaging Angolan independence and unity, and praised the "explicit and correct" stand of the OAU in attempting to mediate differences among the Angolan groups. The 12 November PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article had stated the same positions and had also hailed the efforts of OAU Chairman Amin to uphold the dignity of the OAU by resisting Soviet pressure to recognize one group over the other two.

RECOGNITION OF FORMER  
PORTUGUESE COLONIES

In contrast to its circumspection regarding the recognition of an Angolan administration during a time of civil war, Peking had promptly extended recognition to other former Portuguese colonies in Africa that gained their independence and made the transition to statehood with relatively unified leaderships. Thus, the Chinese

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\* For background on past Chinese comment on Angola, see the TRENDS of 30 July 1975, pages 11-12, of 17 September 1975, pages 25-26, and of 5 November 1975, pages 31-32.

extended recognition in the name of the Chinese Government, either in messages from Chou En-lai or in a joint communique, on the independence of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome and Principe. Peking had also celebrated each date, except in the case of Cape Verde, with a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial.

#### DPRK RECOGNIZES LUANDA GOVERNMENT, SILENT ON RIVAL GROUPS

The DPRK announced in a 15 November message from Kim Il-song to PRA President Neto that Pyongyang would recognize the new government in Luanda. The same day KCNA reported that a DPRK delegation headed by the North Korean ambassador to Egypt had attended the 11 November independence day celebrations in the Angolan capital.

DPRK media are not known to have commented previously on the fighting among the contending Angolan factions or, until now, to have explicitly offered exclusive endorsement to any of them. For example, a 2 November NODONG SINMUN commentary on Angola denouncing "armed intervention and sabotage" by "imperialists and colonialists" and demanding the withdrawal of South African "mercenaries" avoided specifically backing any Angolan independence group, claiming only that the "Angolan people" would achieve independence by fighting in "firm unity." Last September, however, Pyongyang may have indirectly indicated its preference when Kim Il-song sent a message greeting a two-day "solidarity conference" in Mozambique that drew attendance from representatives of several former Portuguese colonies, including Angola. Delegations to the meeting included those from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe countries, and the Moscow-backed MPLA, but not the other contending Angolan liberation movements.

Since by recognizing Neto's PRA Pyongyang finds itself on the same side as Moscow and at odds with Peking--just the reverse of the overall North Korean position in recent years--it may be trying to keep a low profile on the issue. Perhaps indicative of Pyongyang's sensitivity, DPRK media have carried no authoritative comment greeting Angolan independence, and in his 15 November message to Neto, addressed only to the President of the PRA, Kim did not mention the MPLA, noting only the "victory won by the Angolan people." By contrast, when Mozambique became independent in June, NODONG SINMUN marked the occasion with an editorial article, and Kim's message, addressed to both the head of FRELIMO and the president of Mozambique, referred to the leadership of the Liberation Front of Mozambique in the struggle of independence.



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# DRV FOLLOWS USSR LEAD ON RECOGNITION, WARNS AGAINST CIVIL WAR

North Vietnam conveyed its recognition of the MPLA government in a 12 November message from Premier Pham Van Dong to President Neto, and the PRG followed with a similar move on the 14th. The DRV announcement had been anticipated as early as 30 October, when a commentary in the North Vietnamese party paper NHAN DAN led off a spate of comment on Angola that broke a long-standing Hanoi silence on the rival Angolan movements. The 30 October commentary, characterizing the MPLA as the "organizer and leader of the Angolan people's struggle," was followed on the 9th by a commentary in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and on the 11th by an editorial in NHAN DAN.

Judging by available accounts, the Hanoi press comment has not echoed Moscow's direct denunciations of the MPLA's major rivals--the FNLA and UNITA--but has included veiled criticism in warning against alleged foreign efforts to encourage civil war in Angola. Thus, the 30 October NHAN DAN commentary, as reported by VNA, decried support by "U.S.-led imperialists" and "African reactionaries" for "counterrevolutionary forces" which are opposing the MPLA. Similarly, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN warned against outside efforts to "rig up a series of reactionary organizations" and pit them against the MPLA. The NHAN DAN editorial on the 11th warned more generally against U.S. collusion with "Portuguese colonialist extremists" and "racist regimes" in South Africa and Rhodesia to "turn the Angolan people's anti-colonialist war into a 'civil war.'"

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## P O R T U G A L

## SOVIET MEDIA SUPPORT PCP CONFRONTATION WITH GOVERNMENT

By favorably reporting the recent construction workers strike in Portugal, along with other antigovernment movements in the country supported by the Portuguese Communist Party, Soviet media have lent their endorsement to PCP leader Alvaro Cunhal's apparent determination to force a showdown with the government of Prime minister Azevedo, the sixth Portuguese government since the April 1974 overthrow of the fascist regime.\* However, both Moscow and the PCP stopped short of demanding Azevedo's removal, focusing instead on the need to expel the Popular Democrats from the government and "restructure" the Armed Forces Movement to allow for greater participation by leftists. Moscow even noted a lukewarm Communist Party declaration of support for the sixth government's original program, indicating that it had not been enacted because of "the inclusion in the government of representatives of the Popular Democratic Party and other elements which do not insure the fulfillment of the government program."

PRAVDA's Lisbon correspondent B. Kotov wrote on 15 November that Portugal's recurrent political crisis had been "exacerbated once again" by rightwing forces which had "unleashed a broad provocative campaign against the working class and its political and trade union organizations, falsely accusing them of preparing a coup d'etat." Kotov noted that the demonstration by construction workers--who were said to have been simply "opposing the tyranny of the bosses and the positions of certain officials"--had served as a pretext for the rightwing campaign. PRAVDA reported that the "bourgeois" PPD had announced the "mobilization of its supporters in connection with the 'inevitable communist coup'" and added that the Socialist Party (PS) leadership also had expressed fears of a "coup by a left minority." Kotov rejected these characterizations of the strike and noted that the PCP supported the strikers' demands, adding, however, that the party did not approve of the Sao Bento blockade because it was "fraught with the dangers of repressive measures in response." The writer reported that the PCP had dismissed PPD and PS charges as "ballyhoo" and had called for expulsion of the PPD from the government and the "unification of revolutionary trends" with the Armed Forces Movement (MFA).

Agreeing with Kotov's assessment of the strike in a 15 November IZVESTIYA dispatch, correspondent L. Agapov called the strikers' demands "just" and deplored efforts by "the leadership of the

\* The strike, condemned by moderate political leaders as an attempt to topple the government, culminated in a massive demonstration which besieged Sao Bento palace, imprisoning the prime minister until he met the strikers' demands on 14 November.

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Popular Democratic and Socialist Parties" to force authorities to take harsh measures against the workers. Agapov also accused the two parties of leveling against the PCP the "absurd" charge of inciting rebellion. Consistent with Moscow's tendency to portray the Azevedo government as one in disarray, Agapov avoided any reference to decisive actions by Azevedo and noted that the Revolutionary Council had been unable to resolve the strike because of "sharp differences between its members."

A TASS dispatch published in RED STAR on 14 November examined a PCP statement suggesting a way out of Portugal's morass and reported the PCP's finding that the program expounded by the sixth government at the time of its formation was "acceptable," but that the program had been bypassed because of opposition from PPD and likeminded elements within the government. RED STAR reported the PCP's condemnation of the "swing to the right" in government agencies and noted the communists' call for a reorganization of the MFA in order to "make this movement a revolutionary force." RED STAR replayed the PCP's call for the "unity of all revolutionary forces," and other media also have emphasized the need for "democratic and revolutionary forces" to rally in defense of the revolution.

The unity of the left is a standard Moscow theme on Portugal, and these phrases are sometimes used to refer to the Socialists, as well as the communist and other leftwing groups, but, currently, the Socialists do not seem to be included. Moscow and the PCP again have grown openly critical of the Socialist Party leadership, often lumping the Socialists with the anathematized Popular Democrats.

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## YUGOSLAVIA - BULGARIA

## FOREIGN MINISTERS REFER MACEDONIAN ISSUE TO TITO-ZHIVKOV SUMMIT

The communique issued at the end of Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov's 11-13 November visit to Yugoslavia included an agreement by Mladenov and his Yugoslav opposite number, Minic, to refer "disputed questions"--a reference to the Macedonian issue--to a future Tito-Zhivkov summit, at a time to be determined. The envisaged summit would aim at reconciling the contradictory stands of the two regimes on: (1) Yugoslav insistence on speaking for the Macedonians in Bulgaria and (2) Bulgarian insistence on excluding the Macedonian issue from the question of bilateral relations. Largely as a result of this issue, relations between the two countries have been cool for several years, and the two leaders have not exchanged visits since 1967.

In an apparent effort to reconcile the differences, the two foreign ministers, according to the communique on the visit, reached agreement that the two sides "should prepare and work out ways and means of discussing and settling questions concerned with the further development of every aspect of mutual relations, including disputed questions." The communique went on to specify that a meeting of Tito and Zhivkov would be held to determine "these ways and means," thus suggesting that the agenda would be limited to questions of procedure rather than substance.

The failure of the two sides to nail down a date for the proposed meeting tends to suggest the tentative nature of the agreement. Zagreb radio commentator Sundic on the 13th seemed to suggest this interpretation in asserting that "it goes without saying that [the date of the meeting] depends on the entire development of relations" between the two countries. The unusual procedure of reporting the proposed meeting in the form of an agreement, rather than in the form of an invitation from one of the two leaders, also raises the possibility the meeting might take place at a convenient neutral site, such as in East Berlin during the proposed European communist party conference. Tito and Zhivkov set a precedent for such a meeting when they held a short bilateral meeting in Helsinki last July during the European security conference.

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## VIETNAM

### CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE ON STATE UNIFICATION OPENS IN SAIGON

More details of communist plans for the formation of a single, central government for all of Vietnam have been revealed in media reports on the opening in Saigon on 15 November of the political consultative conference attended by high-level delegations from North and South Vietnam. The convocation of the consultative conference followed closely on the heels of the 9 November announcement by Hanoi and Saigon media that meetings had been held in the North and South to discuss unification and to select delegations to the joint consultative conference.\* The first session of the conference heard reports by the head of the North's delegation, DRV National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman and VWP Politburo member Truong Chinh, and by the head of the South's delegation, Secretary of the Southern Party Organization and VWP Politburo member Pham Hung.

Truong Chinh's "important political report" provided the first evidence that the Vietnam Workers Party Central Committee had held its 24th plenum earlier this year and reached the decisions on the South's future which now are being implemented in the move toward early state unification. Viewed in the light of public statements by North Vietnamese leaders during the first weeks after the communist takeover in the South last spring, Truong Chinh's report suggests that the plenum thrashed out doctrinal differences revolving around the issue of whether the South could immediately begin the socialist revolution.

TRUONG CHINH REPORT Transmitted in full by the VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY on the 17th, Truong Chinh's 15 November report on behalf of the North's delegation to the political consultative conference dealt in standard fashion with the history of Vietnam's "struggle" for independence and reunification and with the recent communist takeover of the South. In his discussion of the "immediate tasks of the Vietnamese revolution," Truong Chinh elaborated the reasons that the South is ready to "embark on the road of socialism" along with the North. He concluded his report by recounting the economic and political problems involved

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\* The meetings in North and South Vietnam to prepare for the consultative conference are discussed in FBIS SPECIAL REPORT "Reunification of Vietnam: Communists Move to Create Single Central Government," No. 312, 14 November 1975.

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and the benefits that unification will bring and by expounding on electoral procedures and the duties of the future nationwide assembly which is to form a single, central government for North and South Vietnam.

The reports on the conference have thus far not revealed when the elections for the single national assembly will take place; however, Truong Chinh indicated in his report that the voting must be preceded by a new census in South Vietnam to determine the proper number of assembly deputies to assign each voting district. Truong Chinh also declared that, in addition to appointing "leading organs of the state," the nationwide assembly would be responsible for drafting a new constitution "of the reunified Vietnam." He noted too that results of the consultative conference will be approved by a "coming session" of the Fifth DRV National Assembly and by a South Vietnam "people's congress."

In making his case for including the South in "the same strategic task" as the North--that is, "the socialist revolution and the building of socialism"--Truong Chinh argued that only when both parts of the country are socialist can reunification "rest on a practical and solid groundwork." According to Truong Chinh, South Vietnam should not have to "limit itself" to a "people's national and democratic revolution" now that it is "completely liberated," and he held up the specter of the "blood-soaked path" of capitalist development as the alternative to following the transition to socialism.

#### CENTRAL COMMITTEE 24TH PLENUM

The decision by the communist hierarchy on the government integration of South Vietnam with the North apparently was made by the 24th plenum of the VWP Central Committee, whose resolution Truong Chinh cited as authority for proclaiming "the whole of the country . . . is advancing towards socialism." The declaration on the joint advance to socialism appears to represent a shift from the course that DRV leaders were initially espousing for the South last spring. For example, First Secretary Le Duan noted in his 15 May Victory Day speech that the South should now build a "national democratic regime," while socialist construction was being stepped up in the North. DRV Premier Pham Van Dong, in his address to the first session of the Fifth DRV National Assembly on 3 June, was more ambiguous about the South's future but made no mention of it becoming socialist. He merely cited the existence of a "progressive democratic regime" in the South, contrasting it with the "socialist regime in the North."

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Pham Van Dong did assert in his 2 September National Day speech that "the entire country [is now] . . . advancing toward socialism," thus seeming to indicate that the crucial decision was actually made sometime after his June National Assembly speech and before his National Day speech.\* During these three months there was a two-week period in mid-July when North Vietnamese leaders were noticeably absent from public view, and it could have been then that the 24th plenum was convened. From 6 to 21 July no members of the VWP Politburo are known to have been reported by the media as having made a public appearance, although at least one foreign national day reception--Mongolia's on 11 July--would normally have required Politburo-level representation.

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\* For a discussion of Pham Van Dong's National Day speech and his remarks on all of Vietnam becoming socialist, see the TRENDS of 4 September 1975, pages 15-17.

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# U S S R

## ECONOMIC REGIONALISM ISSUE REVIVED BY UKRAINIAN OFFICIAL

The chronic issue of regionalism versus centralization in the management of the Soviet economy has been revived by A. Yemelyanov, director of the Ukrainian State Planning Committee's economic research institute. Writing in the CPSU journal KOMMUNIST No. 15 of October, Yemelyanov argued that regional planning should be given priority over the needs of individual central ministries and that republic planners should be given enhanced responsibilities vis-a-vis central planners. Controversy over this issue has been dormant since 1972-73, when a proposal by centralizers to redraw republic boundaries to promote economic efficiency provoked polemical exchanges. The new attack on the centralized ministerial system may be seen as another item in the accumulating evidence that Kosygin's position in the leadership has weakened, since he is closely associated with the September 1965 abolition of the sovnarkhoz system and reestablishment of a centralized ministerial system.\*

Yemelyanov argued that the present system, which, "as is well known, was set up mainly by decisions of the September 1965 plenum," concentrated too much power in branch ministries and stripped local organs of the requisite control over local enterprises. Republic and oblast organs cannot now adequately plan use of local labor and natural resources, he claimed, because many local enterprises answer only to Moscow ministries, which confirm their production plans without consulting local government bodies.

He disputed the argument by some economists that the rights of local organs should not be expanded because republic and oblast borders do not correspond to efficient economic units and that borders have to be redrawn before local organs can receive any enhanced control. Yemelyanov argued that the disparity between present administrative units and natural economic units was not great and that present administrative units could improve production efficiency if given greater latitude.

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\* Another recent sign of Kosygin's weakened position was the ignoring by Soviet media of the tenth anniversary of Kosygin's September 1965 economic reform; see the TRENDS of 16 October 1975, pages 24-25.



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The Ukrainian economist sweetened his argument by identifying it with the notion of "complex" regional planning, which Brezhnev has discussed favorably and which Leningrad officials have been developing. Yemelyanov proposed that local planners be given the right to plan for all enterprises in their areas, even if some of these were All-Union enterprises subordinate to Moscow ministries. He also proposed that territorial plans be formulated before branch plans are confirmed, so that the latter would have to be based on the former.

Yemelyanov's article, appearing as it does in the top party journal, suggests a revival of the perennial conflict between centralizers and decentralizers among Soviet economic theorists and planning officials. The issue last broke out publicly when a December 1972 QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS article by Gosplan official V. Kistanov, speaking for the centralizers, went so far as to suggest that republic borders be redrawn to create more efficient economic units. Kistanov argued that economic factors were just as important as nationality factors in determining republic borders.\* Kistanov's writings clearly reflected a movement among Moscow officials to cut back local jurisdiction but this movement provoked a sharp reaction and apparently failed. Efforts by central ministry officials to reduce the role of republic planners in formulating plans were protested by Uzbek Gosplan Chairman S.K. Ziyadullayev in a June 1973 ECONOMIC GAZETTE article.\*\* Gosplan's own organ, PLANNED ECONOMY, in May 1973 editorially criticized some central ministry officials for proposing to cut republic organs out of the planning process, so that local officials would receive only final, already-approved plans for enterprises located in their areas.\*\*\*

Although controversy over republic versus branch planning has not appeared in the press recently, there has been local pressure to create new regional planning bodies to enhance local authorities' control over development in their own areas. RSFSR Gosplan Deputy Chairman N. Zenchenko referred to this in a June 1975 PLANNED ECONOMY article, noting that many local party and soviet organizations

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\* See the TRENDS of 10 January 1973, pages 13-14.

\*\* See the TRENDS of 5 July 1973, page 17.

\*\*\* See the TRENDS of 23 May 1973, pages 17-19.

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were advocating creation of new planning organs for local economic regions to replace the planning commissions liquidated a few years ago. He cited proposals by leaders of Leningrad, Gorkiy and Krasnoyarsk to have their own planning institutes to promote comprehensive regional planning. Kurgan Second Secretary A.S. Sennikov had used his speech at the December 1974 RSFSR Supreme Soviet session, reported in the 26 December 1974 SOVIET RUSSIA, to urge a "complex" approach to local planning and to state that many errors could have been avoided if territorial planning organs existed for economic regions.

#### BIOGRAPHY INDICATES PONOMAREV LOST CPSU SECTION CHIEF POST

A biography of CPSU Central Committee Secretary B.N. Ponomarev in the latest volume of the LARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA provides the first indication to date that Ponomarev lost his post as head of the Central Committee's international section when he became Central Committee secretary in 1961. The just issued volume covering the letter "P" lists Ponomarev as head of a Central Committee section "1955-61". All previous biographies of Ponomarev in the various encyclopedias and other materials have listed him as head of a section "from 1955-", without specifying a date of departure, implying that he still held the post in addition to being Central Committee secretary "from 1961-." If the new biography is accurate, this indicates that there has been no formal head of the international section since 1961, although Ponomarev clearly has continued to exercise overall supervision over the section.

There appears to be no uniform CPSU practice regarding the job titles of Central Committee secretaries who concurrently supervise Central Committee sections. Secretary Demichev supervised Agitprop until his removal in 1974, but was never identified as section head; Agitprop apparently has had no section head since V.I. Stepakov was removed in 1970. Secretary Katushev supervised the bloc relations section while K.V. Rusakov was head, but since Rusakov's transfer to Brezhnev's secretariat in 1972, there has been no identified head. V.I. Dolgikh became Central Committee secretary for heavy industry in 1972, but neither he nor anyone else has been identified as head of the heavy industry section since that time.

Secretary Kulakov may or may not continue to head the agriculture section; he was always listed as head of the section starting in 1964 and as secretary starting in 1965, but there has never been any sign that he left the former post when taking up the latter. Most

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biographies of Secretary Kapitonov, including that in the latest LARGE SOVIET ENCYCLOPEDIA, are similarly ambiguous about whether he simultaneously heads the organizational-party work section. However, the 1966 and 1971 encyclopedia yearbooks clearly indicated his continuing dual role, listing him as head of the section from 1964 to 1965 and as Central Committee secretary and section head from December 1965 to the present.

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## NOTES

SINO-U.S. RELATIONS: Peking has been strangely silent on recent remarks by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger that highlight continued U.S.-Soviet differences. Peking thus far has not mentioned President Ford's 7 November speech in Boston stressing the need for a strong U.S. defense, his 10 November "Meet The Press" interview in which he indicated that a SALT agreement and a Brezhnev visit were unlikely this year, or Secretary Kissinger's 10 November press conference in which he criticized Soviet rejection of a recent compromise U.S. arms limitation proposal. This silence contrasts sharply with Peking's normal practice of reporting high-level U.S. official statements reflecting strategic vigilance against the USSR or U.S.-Soviet differences. Peking's failure to report the recent remarks on SALT is particularly notable since NCNA on 9 November did report the State Department spokesman's disclosure on the 5th that Moscow had rejected the latest U.S. compromise proposal.

PRC ON U.S. FOOD PLAN: PRC delegate Yang Li-kung's address before the UN Food and Agriculture Organization conference in Rome on 14 November has offered Peking's first authoritative indictment of the U.S. "global food strategy" set forth by Secretary Kissinger at the UN World Food Conference in Rome one year ago. Avoiding explicit reference to the United States or Kissinger, the PRC delegate denounced the "superpower" which has "bragged about its food-producing capability" and "dished up a 'global food strategy'" in order to "use food as a weapon" against the Third World. The delegate said the U.S. food plan was "nothing but a new trick" designed to exploit U.S. food reserves to help preserve the "old international economic order" and to keep Third World countries "subservient under its sway." The Chinese address went on to attack the USSR at somewhat greater length, especially Moscow's large food purchases "causing shortage in supply and a sharp rise in food prices." Chinese speakers at the UN Food conference last November had duly criticized Soviet proposals but had ignored Kissinger's address. The Chinese speakers last year had expressed unspecified "reservations" about the meeting's resolution calling for the establishment of an "international food security system."

PRC EDUCATIONAL POLICY: Shanghai, a model province which often sets an example for all of China, appears engaged in a new drive to achieve a better balance in the schools between traditional academic subjects and study of the current party line. Shanghai radio on 10 November broadcast an investigation report which, while warning that it is still wrong to put "intellectual training first," credited the party branch of a local middle school with overcoming certain "muddle-headed

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viewpoints" and making it clear that it is not permissible to relax "intellectual education." Such an open endorsement of intellectual training in Shanghai's schools seems to represent yet another step away from the ideologically motivated educational reforms announced during the cultural revolution, a period when academicians were attacked for neglecting political training in their classrooms. The broadcast did not contain the customary bow to cultural revolutionary educational reforms, recalling only that "during an earlier period" some leaders and teachers at the school "wrongly believed that . . . it is dangerous to grasp intellectual study" because of fears they would be "charged with committing the mistake of putting intellectual study first." The broadcast lauded the party unit at the school for encouraging teachers to "grasp intellectual study" in order to improve the "quality of teaching" and the "quality of cultural courses." Shanghai's WEN HUI PAO on 10 November published an editor's note pegged to the investigation report which underscored the need to strike the proper balance between political and academic study, pointing out that putting intellectual training in first place must be "criticized," but that "slackening intellectual training in violation of the party principles on education is also not permissible."

PRC-TAIWAN: Peking comment on the 109th anniversary of Sun Yat-sen's birth on 12 November has deviated from Peking's usually circumspect rhetoric on this occasion by harshly attacking Republic of China Premier Chiang Ching-kuo. The anniversary was marked by the usual NCNA reports of celebrations in Peking and other cities, but Peking's broadcasts to Taiwan went beyond past wild criticism against unnamed Kuomintang authorities. The attack on Chiang Ching-kuo came in a radio commentary by a former high-level Kuomintang official who sharply denounced the Taipei government and explicitly criticized Chiang Ching-kuo. The commentator referred to "junior Chiang...following in his father's steps" and alleged that he was "more hard-handed and even spares no effort in rejecting and dealing blows to the old followers of Sun Yat-sen." Peking has frequently attacked Chiang personally in recent months.

DPRK ANTI-U.S. PROTEST: The latest of North Korea's periodic official protests of alleged U.S. aggressive actions came in a 15 November DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement which accused the United States in standard terms of "aggravating" the situation in Korea. The spokesman specifically criticized joint U.S.-ROK military exercises, U.S. military assistance to South Korea, and U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons along the DMZ. The statement, which seemed timed to coincide with the UN General Assembly's consideration on the 18th of two resolutions on the Korean question, accused the United States of accelerating "war preparations" against the DPRK at the very time the

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General Assembly was discussing the Korean issue. It called the U.S. actions "powder-reeking war preparations" designed to increase tensions in Korea in order to justify the U.S. troop presence in the South and perpetuate the division of the peninsula. One charge made in the statement tied the early November flight of several B-52 bombers from Guam to Okinawa with a U.S. "nine-day war plan" against the North. An 11 November NODONG SINMUN commentary had previously denounced the introduction of B-52's into Okinawa, and unlike the official statement, had raised the sensitive issue of connivance by Japanese "reactionaries" in U.S. plots against Korea. In protesting U.S. military assistance in South Korea, the 15 November statement claimed that the United States was planning to send 60 late model fighter aircraft to the ROK, a charge that had been the focus of the last official North Korean protest of U.S. actions in the South, a 14 October Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement.

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# A P P E N D I X

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 10 - 16 NOVEMBER 1975

<u>Moscow (2886 items)</u>		<u>Peking (990 items)</u>	
FRG President Scheel	(--)	Angola	(8%) 18%
in USSR		Burma President Ne Win	(--)
[Podgorny Speech	(--)	in PRC	15%*
Angola	(--)	UNGA 30th Session	(5%) 7%
[Podgorny	(--)	PRC-Western Samoa	(--)
Independence	3%]	Diplomatic Relations	
Greetings		Announcement on Ford's	(--)
China	(6%) 5%	Upcoming Visit to PRC	3%
		FAO Conference on	(--)
		Agriculture, Rome	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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\* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Ne Win.